

934-5

4 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Charles Sorrels,
International Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Perceptions of the US-Soviet Strategic Balance

1. Herewith are copies of the report which you requested on perceptions of the US-Soviet strategic balance. It was prepared by the FBIS Analysis Group and reviewed by the Office of Political Research (OPR). In the review process OPR scanned classified materials including diplomatic cables as well as unclassified military journals and USIA media reaction reports. These supplementary sources yielded few additional details, none of them sufficiently at variance with the FBIS report to justify adding more words to the paper.

2. We appreciate your interest in the intelligence aspects of the general problem of perceptions analysis, and are actively making efforts to advance the state of the art of this technique. As you know, there is still no agreed upon, systematic approach to perceptions. We have proposed that the newly established Analytical Support Center, jointly funded by CIA, ARPA, and the IC Staff, undertake a project of basic research in this field.

EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment:
As stated



PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE AS REFLECTED IN FOREIGN MEDIA

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents the results of an examination of the German, British, French, and Japanese media for assessments of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, particularly in the light of the Vladivostok summit. The major daily newspapers and periodicals as well as the radio output of these countries have been examined for the period from September 1974 through February 1975.

Foreign media attention to the subject has been almost exclusively related to major international events, with the bulk of the comment centering around the Vladivostok meeting on 23-24 November last year and the resumption of the SALT II negotiations on 31 January this year. German and Japanese media have commented fairly extensively on these events, British and French much more sparsely.

Official statements on matters relevant to the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance have been both rare and highly circumspect. Those that have been reported in the public media, however, are noted in this report.

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S U M M A R Y

1. West European press comment on the Vladivostok summit expressed disappointment over the limited nature of the arms control agreement reached, but it did reflect at least some satisfaction over the political implications of the meeting. As Professor Raymond Aron of France put it, whatever the agreement's shortcomings, it is "worth more symbolically than the acknowledgment of a fundamental disagreement." As for the shortcomings, West German, British, and French commentators focused on the high ceiling for MIRVs, which they interpreted as at least a short-term advantage for the Soviets and a long-term incentive for a qualitative arms race.
2. West German officials tended to take a self-interested view of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, stressing the need to maintain strong conventional forces in Europe as a guarantee of detente. Chancellor Schmidt, Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Leber, commenting on strategic problems in the aftermath of Schmidt's visit to Washington in early December, all warned against tendencies within NATO to slacken on defense expenditures. German concern over budget cutting affecting the military balance was not limited to the European NATO allies, but embraced the economy-minded tendencies in the U.S. Congress as well. West German media expressed particular satisfaction that the Vladivostok agreement did not affect U.S. forward-based systems in Europe.
3. The limited British press comment stressed the uncertainties created by Soviet testing of new, large missile systems and the difficulties involved in verifying compliance with the MIRV ceiling agreement. British commentators pointed up what they saw as a contradiction between the professed goals of Vladivostok and the results of the meeting--far from encouraging greater mutual confidence and stability the agreements seemed to open the door to a new arms race. THE ECONOMIST, for example, saw the agreements as providing an incentive for the further development of mobile missiles.
4. French comment reflected mixed assessments of Vladivostok; while the meeting was regarded as politically useful, its practical utility in terms of bringing about a curb on the arms race was regarded with skepticism. In a major series of articles in LE FIGARO, Raymond Aron concluded that the agreement would be likely

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to lead to "instability of mutual deterrence" and intensified U.S. efforts to stay at the forefront of the technological arms race. Another prominent French commentator, Michel Tatu, reached a different conclusion, describing the Vladivostok agreement as the long-sought "breakthrough." He also, however, foresaw continuing difficulties for the negotiations at SALT II.

5. While Japanese press comment reflected some anxiety over what was regarded as the high nuclear ceilings agreed on at Vladivostok, the Japanese also saw an increasing Soviet-American "interdependence" and a mutual recognition that a nuclear balance is essential to detente. But two Japanese newspapers, ASAHI and MAINICHI, saw signs of a developing quantitative nuclear arms race rather than any effort to establish a balance.

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PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE AS REFLECTED IN FOREIGN MEDIA

I. WEST GERMANY

SCHMIDT, GENSCHER, Chancellor Schmidt, Foreign Minister Genscher
LEBER STATEMENTS and Defense Minister Leber all discussed the
question of Western defense in the context of
detente within a four-day period in December following Schmidt's and
Genscher's meeting in Washington with President Ford and the NATO
Council meeting in Brussels. While none of the German officials
offered any detailed assessment of the Vladivostok agreement, all
stressed the need for a strong Western defense as a prerequisite for
strategic arms limitation and meaningful East-West detente.

In his 11 December foreign policy statement to the Bundestag,
carried by German radio and television, Chancellor Schmidt told the
deputies that his talks with President Ford on 5-6 December
emphasized their "common view" that "political cohesion and a strong
defense readiness must remain indispensable preconditions for
further efforts in East-West detente. It is on the basis of these
preconditions that headway must be made in arms limitation." Schmidt
added that President Ford had explained his meeting with Brezhnev
"in great detail" and that "the positive character, the positive
significance" of the Vladivostok SALT agreement had "become plain
to us."

Foreign Minister Genscher, in an 12 December interview on Mainz
Television, welcomed the Vladivostok SALT agreement but added that
"the limitation of strategic nuclear arms requires that in the
conventional sphere no increasing superiority of the Warsaw Pact
states must occur." Genscher warned that the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies were trying to increase their conventional forces
advantage and that the NATO alliance must take this into account if
it is to "maintain the prerequisites for our detente policy."

Interviewed on Munich radio on 14 December, Defense Minister Leber
similarly underscored the Soviet defense effort and noted that the
11.5 percent of its gross national product which the Soviet Union
spent for defense was more than any Western country was spending for
military purposes.

SOVIET MISSILE The most persistent theme in West German press
ADVANTAGES comment was one of concern over the prospective
Soviet advantage deriving from greater throw
weight capability. Thus DIE WELT's Adalbert Baerwolf, a technological
expert who has reported from NASA, wrote on 27 November that the
Vladivostok agreement had put the United States "at a disadvantage"

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because it had "failed to make contractual stipulations as to the throw weight equivalent. Thereby the Soviets are granted a considerable advantage, since most land-based Soviet long-range missiles have an inherently greater throw weight capability than the 1,000 bunkered Minuteman missiles."

The potential Soviet advantage was further pointed up by Ernst-Ulrich Fromm of DIE WELT, formerly the paper's Moscow correspondent, who noted that the Soviet deployment of MIRVs mounted on their own "far heavier" land-based guided missiles "could mean," according to U.S. computations, that the Soviet Union in 1980 would have from 15,000 to 17,000 MIRVs compared to approximately 10,000 for the United States.

An unattributed DER SPIEGEL article on 2 December, entitled "Costly Breakthrough," took the argument one step further and said that the Vladivostok accord could give the Soviets a "surprise strike" capability against U.S. ICBM's. The agreement to allow 1,320 MIRVed missiles, the paper said, would confer "an inestimable advantage" on the Soviets, "whose larger missiles could proportionately carry more warheads." While the USSR now lags in MIRV technology, the paper added, the U.S. military and some members of Congress "are afraid the Soviets might by the early 1980's have mounted so many MIRVs--despite, or even perhaps due to, SALT II--that they will have the capability to carry out a surprise strike against the U.S. land-based ICBM's." This possibility in turn would force the United States to produce new, larger missiles which can carry more warheads than the current generation of Minuteman or Poseidon missiles. The paper concluded that "the arms race would start all over again--even if limited in quantities, yet not in the search for a higher quality of weapons." How the United States intends to pay for such a race, the paper said, "is something Ford has not yet revealed."

Kenneth Myers, in the influential Hamburg weekly DIE ZEIT of 29 November, similarly remarked on the potential Soviet advantage deriving from the "larger carrying range" and a "larger carrying capacity" of Soviet missiles. He added: "Critical observers in Washington argue that in any further SALT agreement the Americans will have to accept some strategic inferiority. Even after Vladivostok there are sufficient signs that this is Moscow's objective in the negotiations about a new treaty." Both Myers, and another article in the same issue of DIE ZEIT, signed "A.K.", raised the problem of the difficulty of controlling MIRV capacity "when this cannot be ascertained by satellites." The control issue had also been raised by Josef Riedmiller in the 25 November DIE WELT, particularly in connection with Soviet development of mobile missiles.

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The Riedmiller article stressed that there will be a great need for "accuracy" at the Geneva SALT talks in order to produce an equality "based on the correct assessment of the advantages and disadvantages in weapons technology accruing to the opposing sides" and "to prevent either side from gaining a decisive advantage."

The most alarmist West German comment was provided by the pseudonymous "Ein" in the 24 January FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, in an article affirming support for warnings by President Ford and Defense Secretary Schlesinger about growing Soviet military strength prior to the Congressional budget debate. The article said: "The Soviets have a new strategic bomber. This flying 'atomic launching pad' is completing the Russian rocket capability which is beginning to develop in a frightening way in quality and quantity. The Soviets are about to install two new strategic rocket systems. The core of one system is the SS-18. It is being stored in silos and is said to be able to fire five to eight multiple warheads (MIRV). Every individual warhead has the destructive force of one megaton or 1 million tons of TNT. This rocket is more powerful than any American one. The other new Soviet weapon is the SS-19, equipped with at least six multiple warheads, each of them containing 300 kilotons of explosives."

The article then went on to consider the implications of all this for the credibility of the American deterrent: "Secretary of Defense Schlesinger mainly considers the psychological-moral danger emanating from these rockets for the United States. Everybody knows that the SS-18 and SS-19 rockets can hit and destroy all U.S. rocket positions in their bunkers. If the U.S. Government is unable to counter the Russian strategy with something credible, it will be shaking the confidence in the deterrent force of the United States."

SCHLESINGER DEFENSE
POSTURE STATEMENT

The question of Congressional support for proposed Administration defense expenditure was specifically examined in a 13 February Washington dispatch on Secretary Schlesinger's defense posture report to Congress, the only pertinent comment on the report from any of the four countries considered. The dispatch said that Secretary Schlesinger foresaw the possibility that the Soviet Union, with its present rate of development of strategic offensive weapons, would by 1980 "be in a position to eliminate in a 'first strike' the American intercontinental missiles in subterranean launching pads." While Schlesinger wanted to avoid this "under any circumstances" because it would disturb the existing strategic

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balance--"on which the entire SALT theory is based"--to "the advantage of the Soviet Union," the paper concluded that it is "more than doubtful" that the \$92.8 billion defense budget request for 1976 would be approved by Congress. On the contrary, the paper expected "considerable cuts" in spending on strategic offensive weapons because of Congressional reluctance to meet the high weapons costs in a period of economic recession.

FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS Although much of the West German comment on Vladivostok was apprehensive about the implications of the high MIRV ceilings, commentators Peter Woerdehoff on Cologne radio and Josef Bielmeier on Munich radio, and the provincial newspaper AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE on 25 November all expressed relief that the U.S. forward-based systems in Europe were not to be included in the SALT negotiations. However, a 4 December FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE article signed "Ein" conveyed "shock" over a recent Brookings Institute study which it said suggested a cut of 5,000 in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons located in Europe. While acknowledging that Brookings "is not the government, and considerations are not decisions," the paper contended that the institute's political and military experts "often argue like James Schlesinger, the secretary of defense," and that a decrease in the tactical weapons "seems to be the price the Western big power must pay the Eastern nuclear power" for excluding U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the SALT package.

U.S. NUCLEAR RETARGETING Two West German newspapers considered Secretary Schlesinger's nuclear retargeting doctrine, drawing quite different conclusions. DIE WELT's foreign policy analyst Dieter Cycon felt that a policy of targeting American missiles against Soviet missile bases would not increase the credibility of the U.S. guarantee of Germany. Cycon wondered how the Kremlin leader could immediately determine that the attacking missiles were only designed to "disarm" him and not to destroy his country. "Moreover, he could dislike the disarming idea and retaliate missile for missile." Cycon therefore concluded that under "the new doctrine" the United States "will consider the risk as being too high as long as its own survival is not involved." The pseudonymous "Ein" in the 20 January FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE did not discuss the implications of the selective targeting strategy for German defense but did seem to agree with what he understood to be Secretary Schlesinger's thesis: that limiting atomic attack to military targets could still have a deterrent effect and allow for a "more flexible political use of the atom."

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II. GREAT BRITAIN

OFFICIAL COMMENT While British government leaders have not commented publicly on the Vladivostok agreement British Minister of State for Defense William Rodgers, a sub-Cabinet official, did question Soviet motivation on detente and urge strong Western defense at an international meeting on military science in Munich on 1 February. As reported by West Germany's DPA agency, Rodgers expressed doubt as to whether the USSR was working for a lasting solution rather than merely seeking breathing space to make up the economic advantage of the West. Rodgers said he saw no signs of relaxation in the current Soviet military research and development program.

In view of these doubts, Rodgers concluded that "one should be armed against the possibility that the Soviet Union may regard detente merely as a continuation of the cold war with different methods. The Western defense alliance should, therefore, be maintained sufficiently to act as a deterrent against a military attack or political blackmail. From this stance it would then be possible to try and widen the scope of detente."

MIRV COMPLICATIONS British media discussion of SALT was limited to editorials in the TIMES, FINANCIAL TIMES and GUARDIAN immediately after Vladivostok, two pieces in THE ECONOMIST, and a report by the TIMES Defense Correspondent just prior to the resumption of the SALT talks in Geneva. Although the three editorials appeared before the agreed Vladivostok ceilings were announced, all expressed concern over the complications attendant upon MIRV development.

The TIMES editorial noted that the Soviet Union was testing very large missiles with multiple warheads and that this looked to Western experts like an attempt to achieve first-strike capability. If the Russians deploy only three of the four large land-based missile systems which they've been testing they could emerge with "as many as 7,000 separately targeted warheads in the megaton range, compared with the Americans' 2,000," the paper said. "Disparity in terms of throw-weight would be even greater, and even this does not take into account the buildup of submarine-launched missiles." The Americans could keep ahead in the race, the TIMES said, but if the Russians appeared to be bidding for first-strike capability this "would destroy one of the basic political assumptions of detente, which is that although the Russians will bargain as hard as they can, and exploit every advantage to the full, they do basically accept the need for parity based primarily on the ability of each side to retaliate after an attack."

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Given the possibility that this doctrine is not fully accepted in Moscow, the paper observed that the United States had conveyed "a number of urgent warning signals" to the Soviet Union and cited in this regard the new targeting doctrine, continued work on the advanced Trident submarine-launched missile, the unveiling of the new B-1 bomber, and the launching of a Minuteman missile from the C-5A aircraft. The paper concluded that in advanced technology the United States "is still probably better prepared than the Soviet Union for an all-out arms race."

In interpreting Russian actions, the TIMES allowed for the possibility that the Russians were determined to gain total superiority and used arms agreements to buy time, but the paper was more inclined to see a kind of inertia in Russian policymaking, with current decisions merely carrying forward the missile and naval buildup begun in the 60's "at least partly in response to American superiority in this field." Remarking on the relative isolation of the Soviet military establishment from civilian planners, the paper said that this may make the top Soviet leaders more susceptible to military arguments that the Soviet Union still lags behind the Americans and must catch up before making agreements and that military strength improves political bargaining power. "The same arguments are, after all, not unfamiliar in the West," the paper added.

The FINANCIAL TIMES was concerned that the MIRVs, given the difficult verification problem and their improved accuracy, may present a strong temptation to go on with research and development in pursuit of superiority. Writing a formal treaty to include MIRVs will be difficult, the paper said, because it enters the area of qualitative distinctions and brings with it the verification problem, but the technical problems are soluble if the political will is there. The FINANCIAL TIMES said that final negotiations would succeed only if both sides continue to pursue an understanding in other areas, "most obviously on the Middle East." The paper took some encouragement from the fact "that President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev have been able to take up the dialogue where Mr. Nixon left off."

The GUARDIAN, too, focused on the verification problem, with the MIRV described as "the latest and most dangerous joker." The editorial said: "Pictures taken from satellites or in any other way will not reveal whether the warhead on a missile contains one nuclear weapon, or the six which can be carried by the Soviet SS-9, the eight which can be carried by the SS-19, or the three which can be carried by the American Minuteman III. If neither side can be sure that the other is sticking to the agreement, the agreement itself is weakened."

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DOUBTS ON CEILINGS In its 30 November editorial, again before the proposed SALT-II ceilings were announced, THE ECONOMIST voiced doubts about a Vladivostok formula that might allow even 800 MIRV missiles on each side. With that number, the Russians might still be in a position to deliver three or four times as much megatonnage on America as the Americans could deliver with their smaller MIRV vehicles. "It is this possibility," the weekly said, "that nourishes American fears that the Russians may be tempted to try to knock out virtually all the American land-based missiles by a sudden 'first strike', leaving the Americans to make the hideous decision whether to hit back at Russia's cities and thereby bring retribution on their own. Estimates of the seriousness of this danger vary widely; but it is not evident that the Vladivostok formula will do anything to reduce it."

An article in the International Report section of the 8 February ECONOMIST, entitled "SALT Has a Rather Doubtful Flavor This Year," expressed misgivings about President Ford's and Secretary Kissinger's preference for putting off talks about lower nuclear ceilings until the Vladivostok ones are in place. The result would likely mean a Russian capacity before 1985 of delivering 7,000 separate, independently targetable warheads onto American soil, with Americans presumably matching this with less powerful but more numerous warheads. In that case, "the nuclear balance would not only rest at a much higher level than the present one; it would also be less stable, because of the change in the ratio between warheads and missile silos." In this connection, THE ECONOMIST pointed out that under current conditions at least two warheads must be delivered to be reasonably sure of destroying one enemy missile in its silo, whereas with MIRVs one missile might take care of two or three silos.

The increasing vulnerability of missile silos in the MIRV age, according to the weekly, is leading the United States "to pursue horribly expensive plans to move toward much greater reliance on mobile missiles," with the Russians expected to follow suit. While this could eventually restore the stability threatened by the MIRVs, the chronic problem of verification will remain. THE ECONOMIST puts the paradox quite succinctly: "Among the problems that may have been passed to the SALT teams at Geneva is the one of how to tell, by observation from orbiting satellites, whether a missile in a silo has been mirved. The upcoming problem will be the one of finding out how many missiles each side has, when so many of them will be on the move. Mobility makes for invulnerability, which in turn makes for stability; fine, but then what happens to verification, and to the whole value of numerical limitations?"

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TIMES Defense Correspondent Henry Stanhope on 30 January, like THE ECONOMIST, was skeptical about the ceilings agreed on at Vladivostok and cited the criticisms of Senators Jackson and Buckley in that regard. Stanhope wrote that most observers expected the Soviet Union to quickly advance to the allowed Vladivostok limits. But then any reductions sought in the SALT III negotiations for the post-1985 period would require dismantling of missiles already in place--"something which would be extremely difficult." That's why, Stanhope continued, "critics fear that the two superpowers, in fixing the SALT-2 pact, may be missing a chance (which might not be repeated) of imposing an overdue curb on the arms race."

III. FRANCE

GISCARD COMMENT The only official French comment on the Vladivostok accord was provided by President Giscard d'Estaing during his 20 December televised Elysee Palace press conference. Referring to his conversations with Brezhnev during the Soviet leader's visit to France in early December, Giscard said that he had explained France's defense policy to Brezhnev and that Brezhnev had shown understanding. Giscard then continued: "But I said on the other hand that I was personally very worried over the risks of nuclear proliferation or dissemination, that this was a very serious problem, that the levels which had been reached in the Vladivostok agreements, for instance, were very high levels from the viewpoint of the existence of nuclear means, and that we were ready to examine with the Soviet side what could be the French contribution or share in a realistic effort of disarmament." Giscard noted that he and Brezhnev had reached agreement on holding a world meeting on disarmament but expressed his reservations about the usefulness of such a world meeting, "which runs the risk of producing remote or limited results."

Although monitored French comment was limited, two commentators of worldwide reputation were among the contributors. One was Raymond Aron, who published a series of articles in LE FIGARO in November and December; the other was Michel Tatu, whose article appeared in a February weekend edition of LE MONDE.

ARON ON ARMS RACE Aron's initial comment, in the 28 November LE FIGARO, spoke of the political significance of the Ford-Brezhnev meeting, which showed that "the leaders of both countries want to present a symbolic image of detente," but Aron was unable to assess the "practical significance" of the agreement without knowing the ceilings fixed. When the figures were disclosed by

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President Ford, Aron's 2 December LE FIGARO article described the agreement as "a mystification, even a macabre mystification," which had failed to achieve the desired "conceptual breakthrough." Aron wrote that Secretary Kissinger had hoped to establish with the Soviets "an equivalence calculation system which would decelerate the arms race," but the Vladivostok agreement had failed to achieve that because "it has abandoned equivalence and gone back to equality." With the considerable number of MIRVs allowed--"three or four times as large as the number contemplated by the Americans and far in excess of the existing weapons"--the agreement, "far from decelerating the arms race, will accelerate it," Aron wrote. Anticipating an American effort to counter the Soviet throw-weight advantage with mobile land-based missiles, a new strategic bomber and a missile build-up to the allowable limits, Aron saw the first result of the Vladivostok agreement as "an increase in the American strategic weapons budget."

Pursuing this line of argument in a 27 December LE FIGARO article, Aron wrote that by accepting a ceiling of 1,320 MIRVs "President Ford and the secretary of state appear to have accepted, against their will, both instability of mutual deterrence and a new nuclear arms program." Questioning whether a better agreement might not have been possible, Aron concluded that perhaps, "for mixed political and technical reasons," it wasn't. Thus, Aron wrote: "If the Russians had agreed to limit the number of missiles equipped with multiple warheads to a few hundred, the American arms effort would have been correspondingly reduced. But the United States already possessed 800 (Minuteman and Poseidon) missiles equipped with multiple warheads. The Pentagon experts probably wanted to go on to a second generation of MIRV missiles and the Russians wanted an equality obvious to all."

Declaring that the agreement was of "limited value," Aron concluded that, "despite everything," it "is worth more symbolically than the recognition of a fundamental disagreement." He added that it would be in the interest of both sides to reduce the MIRV ceiling.

TATU ON "BREAKTHROUGH" The noted Kremlinologist Michel Tatu, in the 2-3 February LE MONDE, took a more sanguine view of the Vladivostok agreement and in fact said that President Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok had achieved "the breakthrough which had been sought for the past two years." Tatu said that the Soviet acceptance of equal ceilings was "an important concession." While some of the previous Soviet arguments against the equality concept were unconvincing--especially the presence of the

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American forward-based systems and of the French and British nuclear forces--other arguments had carried more weight, Tatu said. He had in mind the American submarine bases at Holy Loch, Scotland and Rota, Spain which enabled the Americans to keep more submarines on patrol than the Soviets, whose subs had to cover the long distance from Murmansk to get within firing range of the American coasts. Although the Soviets expect to compensate for this advantage by commissioning new Delta-class submarines with longer-range missiles in coming years, Tatu said, they "are not in the habit of anticipating their future progress," and that underlined the significance of their concession.

Tatu did, however, enumerate the main problems which confront the SALT negotiators. First, he raised the question of identification and verification of MIRVs. The Americans are inclined to automatically count as a MIRV any of the Soviet missiles which are capable of carrying MIRVs--that is, the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, he said. He wondered whether the Soviets in their turn would demand that all Minuteman missiles be counted as MIRVs. The negotiators would also have to decide whether to classify the American FB-111 and the Soviet Backfire aircraft as strategic vehicles. Tatu also mentioned the problem of mobile intercontinental missiles. These would reduce the chances of an attacker achieving a truly effective "first strike" and thus presumably reinforce deterrence, but they would also greatly complicate the missile count and verification of agreements concluded. Finally, Tatu noted that the American side had to take into account the Congressional reservations about the Vladivostok agreement, particularly Senator Jackson's criticism that the MIRV ceiling had been set too high, and the feeling that its superiority in missile throw-weight would enable the USSR to gain "a significant advantage" over the United States when the Soviet MIRV program was completed around 1985.

IV. JAPAN

CABINET SECRETARY'S REMARK In line with its traditional reluctance to comment on U.S.-Soviet relations, the only Japanese Government reaction to the Vladivostok summit meeting was a terse remark by the chief cabinet secretary, in a 25 November press conference, that it was significant that President Ford and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev had held talks for the first time.

The three most prominent elements in Japanese comment on the arms limitation agreement were: 1) concern that the established nuclear levels were so high, that there seemed little movement toward

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disarmament; 2) recognition of a growing U.S.-Soviet "interdependence," reflected in economic cooperation and defusing of political crises; and 3) a conviction that the United States and the Soviet Union both agreed that nuclear balance was an indispensable condition for detente.

HIGH NUCLEAR LEVELS Reflecting Japanese disappointment with the terms of the arms limitation agreement, a 26 November TOKYO SHIMBUN editorial said the agreement indicated no "eagerness for realizing nuclear disarmament," and if the United States and the Soviet Union were sincere in their professed "anxiety" about worldwide nuclear proliferation, they "should decide to restrict such weapons more boldly and quickly." A 26 November YOMIURI editorial similarly remarked that if an agreement is concluded on the Vladivostok terms, "there will be no change in the absurd and dangerous situation whereby both the United States and the USSR still have sufficient nuclear war potential to annihilate mankind completely, several times over." Still, the editorial expressed some satisfaction that the agreement signaled an intention to move from "restrictions" toward "reduction." YOMIURI also noted the impact of economic factors encouraging the United States and the Soviet Union to curb arms costs, the interest of the Soviets in American economic cooperation, and the U.S. need for Soviet cooperation in a Mideast settlement. Thus "in various fields" the paper said, "U.S.-Soviet relations are now moving from the stage of mere cooperation into the stage of interdependence," and the significance of the Vladivostok talks was that "they brought this fact into relief." A 26 November ASAHI editorial also commented that the Vladivostok talks marked a new stage in the U.S.-Soviet cooperation policy established during the Nixon presidency.

A page one commentary by Tadashi Takahashi in TOKYO SHIMBUN on 25 November also took up the U.S.-Soviet interdependence theme, with Takahashi labeling it more picturesquely a "Pax Russo-Americana." Takahashi, however, was the only Japanese commentator who clearly felt that the Soviets had got much the better of the bargaining. He thought the Vladivostok guidelines might well lead to the relinquishment of U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, "which superiority has been a traditional policy of the United States." Takahashi even raised the Yalta spectre, comparing an "utterly inexperienced in diplomacy" President Ford with a President Roosevelt visiting the Crimea "in spite of his illness" and being "wheedled by Stalin into agreeing to divide the postwar world between the United States and the Soviet Union."

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NUCLEAR BALANCE NIHON KEZAI and SANKEI in 26 November editorials both viewed the summit agreement as demonstrating U.S.-Soviet recognition that a nuclear balance is the essential linchpin of detente. SANKEI said Brezhnev had even been willing to make concessions to secure this detente, and he cited the USSR's acceptance of a lower missile-launcher ceiling than allowed in the provisional SALT agreement and its willingness to exclude the U.S. forward bases from the negotiations. NIHON KEZAI, while approving the nuclear balance concept, cautioned that the United States and the Soviet Union should establish this balance "solely to fulfill their international responsibility of guaranteeing world security, and not as a means of political or economic domination of the world."

QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE ASAHI on 6 December and MAINICHI on 3 February each carried editorials expressing anxiety over development of a qualitative nuclear arms race. ASAHI cited the MIRV "loophole" and the continued "explosive development" of nuclear weapons techniques to justify its fears. MAINICHI said a "number of troublesome problems" had appeared since the Vladivostok conference and asserted that Secretary Schlesinger's announcement that some of the SS-18 missiles were being MIRVed showed that "the tempo for the deployment of MIRVs by the USSR is quicker than was expected by the U.S. Department of Defense." The paper referred to an American "sense of crisis" that "even from a qualitative standpoint it may be bypassed by the USSR sooner or later." MAINICHI said that "both governments must curb demands of their military."